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I. Introduction 
 
The economics of higher education goes back at least to Adam Smith, who suggested 
over 200 years ago in the Wealth of Nations that professors should get paid based upon 
the number of students enrolled in their classes (Smith, 1976). The econometrics of 
higher education is of much more recent vintage and emerged from the development of 
human capital theory and the efforts to estimate rates of return to education in the 1960s 
and 1970s (Becker 1964, Mincer 1974). 
  In the sections that follow, I survey the various strands of the literature on the 
econometrics of higher education that have developed during the last 40 years and 
indicate how the papers in this issue fit into this literature. I discuss in turn the estimation 
of rates of return to higher education, studies of the academic labor market, studies 
relating to institutional behavior, and studies relating to higher education as an industry. 
As will quickly become clear, the vast majority of the papers in this issue fall within the 
first strand. 
It is important at the outset that I stress to readers that the central econometric 
problem faced by higher education researchers who employ individual-level data is that 
of selection. Similarly, the central econometric problem faced by researchers who use 
market-level data is the difficulty of disentangling demand and supply shocks. Much of 
the challenge that empirical higher education researchers face is attempting to 
satisfactorily resolve these problems. 
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II. Estimating Rates of Return to Higher Education 
 
Literally hundreds of studies have estimated the private return to higher education.  
One problem that has confounded researchers is that measures of student ability are often 
based on achievement test scores, which themselves are determined by completed 
schooling, which in turn is correlated with unobserved measures of ability. Karsten 
Hansen, James Heckman and Kathleen Mullen’s paper in this volume presents a dynamic 
model that attempts to disentangle these issues. 
Inasmuch as a large fraction of American college students begin their study at 2-year 
colleges (and a large share of these students end there as well), it has been natural for 
researchers to ask if the return to attending a 2-year college is the same as the return to 
attending a 4-year institution, and whether graduation from either a 2-year or a 4-year 
institutions has a “sheepskin effect” or if the return to higher education depends only on 
the number of credit hours earned (Grubb 1993, 1995, Jaeger and Page 1996, Kane and 
Rouse 1995a, 1995b). Similarly, as the share of students enrolling in college who are 
nontraditional, in the sense that their enrollment does not take place within a few years of 
high school graduation, increases, attention has also been directed towards estimating 
what the rate of return to higher education is for these students (Leigh and Gill 1997). 
Within the 4-year college and university sector, studies have also focused on whether 
the return to higher education depends upon the type of institution that an individual 
attends. Studies undertaken in the 1980s and early 1990s, which used a variety of 
measures of institutional type, including expenditures per student and measures of 
average student test scores found ambiguous results (James et. al. 1989, Loury and 
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Garman 1995). However, these studies did not model why students attended different 
types of institutions and thus were subject to selection bias problems. 
 More recent studies that attempted to control for selection by segmenting the 
universe of 4-year institutions into six groups based upon the average SAT scores of an 
institution’s entering first-year students and whether the institution was public or private 
and then modeled students’ decisions where to attend college using a Lee (1978) 
framework, found that attendance at the most selective private institutions confers extra 
economic advantages to students, in the form of higher early career earnings and higher 
probabilities of being admitted to the best graduate and professional schools (Ehrenberg 
and Brewer 1996, Brewer, Eide and Ehrenberg 1999, Eide, Ehrenberg and Brewer 1998). 
While Monks (2000b) reports similar conclusions, Dale and Krueger (1999), who control 
for selection more directly based upon knowledge of at what other schools students were 
accepted, obtain different results. They conclude that attendance at selective private 
institutions yields significant economic returns only for under represented minority 
students and students from lower-income families. The paper by Dan Black and Jeffrey 
Smith in this volume extends this literature using recently developed matching models 
and testing for the sensitivity of findings to the functional forms chosen. 
Studies have also addressed the importance of other characteristics of colleges and 
universities for different groups of students. One set of studies has examined whether 
African American students who attend Historically Black Colleges and Universities have 
higher completion rates and higher early career earnings than students who attend other 
4-year institutions, other factors held constant (Constantine, 1998, Ehrenberg and 
Rothstein 1994, Ehrenberg, Rothstein and Olsen, 1999). A second set has addressed 
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whether traditionally single-sex women’s colleges confer economic advantages on 
women who attend them, vis-à-vis comparable women who attend coeducational 
institutions and whether single-sex colleges alter the probabilities that female students 
will graduate from majors that are traditionally male dominated (Rothstein 1993, Solnick 
1995). 
Three papers in this volume are focused on how the location of the production of 
higher education affects outcomes in the labor market, such as migration and wages, 
keeping in mind that the private return to higher education is not necessarily the same as 
the social return. These questions are of great importance because many decisions about 
the production of higher education, including the provision of operating subsidies, are 
made at the state and local level, while college graduates may distribute themselves 
nationally or even internationally. In fact a rationale for why states invest in college and 
university education is that states may enjoy some of the returns from such investments- 
the more highly educated a state’s workforce is the more productive it is and the higher 
the tax revenue that will likely accrue to the state.  
To justify this rationale, two questions must be answered. First, does a state’s 
investment in higher education lead to an increased representation of college-educated 
workers in the state’s population? Second, does the concentration of college-educated 
workers lead to externalities in the form of higher wages for other workers or other social 
benefits that may follow from a more educated populace? 
Groen’s paper uses individual data to address how the state in which an individual 
attends college affects the individual’s probability of finding employment in the state 
after graduation. The econometric challenge that he deals with is that students’ attending 
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college away from their home state may differ from their high school classmates in ways 
that are related to their propensity to move out of state, independent of their attending 
college out of state. 
Bound, Groen, Kedzi and Turner’s paper uses net migration data asks whether the 
production of college graduates in a state affects the stock of college-educated workers 
that live in the state. The key econometric problem they face is distinguishing between 
the case when high demand for college graduates in a state leads to the growth of the 
state’s colleges and universities to meet this demand from the case when an expansion of 
colleges and universities leads to an expansion of employment of college-educated 
workers in the state. Using variation over states and across time, they find that the effect 
of the number of college degrees conferred in a state on the stock of the state’s college-
educated workforce is modest. 
Turning to the question of how the concentration of college graduates in an area 
affects the productivity of all workers in an area, Enrico Morettti examines whether the 
earnings of different types of workers in a city depend upon the share of college 
graduates in the city’s workforce. He finds that all types of workers’ earnings are higher 
when the share of college graduates is higher, suggesting that there are social returns to 
education above and beyond the private returns. Unfortunately, the Bound et. al. paper 
suggests that states may be limited in their ability to capture such social returns through 
supply-side investments in colleges and universities. 
Becker (1964) made the distinction between investments in general human capital 
and investments in specific human capital and asserted that employers would never pay 
for the latter because general human capital investments increase an individual’s 
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productivity at other places as well as at the current employer. Recent research has 
challenged this assertion (Barron, Berger and Black, 1999). Peter Cappelli’s paper in the 
volume addresses why employers provide tuition assistance benefits for their employees. 
Cappelli shows that these benefits are not “paid for” by workers in the form of 
compensating lower wages or benefits. Rather employers who provide such benefits also 
pursue a number of other strategies that effectively bind employees to their firm, so that 
the firm can reap the benefits of the investments. 
 
III. Determinants of College Enrollment, College Graduation and Choice of 
Major 
A major concern of empirical research on the economics of higher education has been 
the role that various public policies have played in enhancing the college enrollment 
rates, persistence in college, and college graduation rates of high school graduates.  Prior 
to the 1970s, the major federal programs that subsidized college attendance were targeted 
programs, such as the GI bill after WWII and other veterans benefits programs, that 
provided subsidies for veterans who attended college. Another major targeted program 
was the Social Security program, which provided benefits to children of deceased, 
disabled, or retired workers, who were between the ages of 19 and 23 and attending 
college (this program was eliminated in the early 1980s).  
Angrist (1993) and Bound and Turner (2002) have studied the impact of veterans 
benefit programs on the college enrollment rates of veterans in the United States, while 
Lemiux and Card (2001) provided estimates of the impact of similar programs in Canada. 
Ehrenberg and Luzadis (1986) studied the impact of the Social Security Program on the 
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amount families and students contributed to their education and the hours that enrolled 
students were employed while in school. 
 Starting in the 1970s, federal financial aid for students became more general with 
the introduction of the Basic Educational Opportunity (Pell) Grant program, the provision 
of subsidized loans, and the provision of employment opportunities through the College 
Work Study program. State financial aid for students primarily took the form of general 
subsidies to all students through keeping tuition at public universities low. Empirical 
economists naturally sought to estimate what the effect of the various federal financial 
aid programs, as well as the levels of public and private tuitions were on college 
enrollment rates and completion rates, both in the aggregate and for specific subgroups of 
the population (e.g. students from low-income families, underrepresented minorities). 
Manski and Wise (1983) was among the first careful studies that used longitudinal micro 
level data, other major studies included McPherson and Shapiro (1991), Kane (1994) and 
Dynarski (forthcoming). Much of the research focused on college enrollment decisions of 
students within a few years of college graduation, however recently Seftor and Turner 
(2002) have found that the Pell Grant program has had sizable effects on the college 
enrollment rates of potential students in their 20s and 30s. 
 In addition to providing indirect assistance to students by keeping tuition levels at 
state universities relatively low, states also provide direct assistance to students to help 
defray the cost of attending college. Historically most state grant aid has been based on 
the financial need of students. However, just as the federal government moved away from 
providing primarily need-based aid with the development of tax credits for education in 
the 1990s, a number of states also moved in this direction. Perhaps the most well known 
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is Georgia and its HOPE Scholarship program. HOPE is awarded to Georgia high school 
graduates who graduated with a high school grade point average of at least a B and who 
enroll in higher education institutions in Georgia. Once enrolled in college, continued 
receipt of HOPE for subsequent year of study depends upon the enrolled students 
maintaining a grade point average of B in college. 
 Several recent studies have analyzed the impact of the HOPE program on college 
enrollment rates of Georgia high school graduates from different racial and family 
income groups, on where the students go to college, and on how the program has 
influenced students choice of majors after they enroll in college and attrition from college 
(Dynarski 2000, Cornwell and Mustard 2001, 2003, Cornwell, Mustard and Sridhar 2002, 
Dee and Jackson 1999). Other studies have more generally addressed how state financial 
aid policies and federal tax credits influence college enrollment rates (Dynarski 2002, 
Long 2002a). Avery and Kane (2002) have examined whether provision of information 
about college requirements and the availability of financial aid, along with enhanced 
counseling of students influences high school course selection, college application and 
college enrollment decisions of students from lower-income families. 
 Financial aid also comes from institutions and studies based on institutional data 
and surveys of individuals have addressed how institutional aid levels influence the 
decision of students to initially enroll at specific institutions to which they have been 
admitted (Ehrenberg and Sherman 1984, Seneca and Taussig 1987, Moore, Studenmund 
and Slobko, 1991, Curs and Singell 2002, Avery and Hoxby 2002, Linsenmeier, Rosen 
and Rouse 2002, van der Klauuw 2002) and to persist in these institutions (Singell 2001, 
Bettinger 2002). Many students work at least part-time while they are enrolled in college 
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to help finance their educations and other research has addressed how college students’ 
hours of employment influence their grade point averages and progress to degrees 
(Ehrenberg and Sherman 1987). The paper by Todd Stinebrickner and Ralph 
Stinebrickner in this issue also addresses this question.  
Many students attending college, especially those attending 2-year institutions, 
live at home and commute to college. Not surprisingly, research has shown that high 
school graduates’ college enrollment probabilities depend upon the proximity of colleges 
to their homes (Tinto 1985, Rouse 1994, Card 1995). Bridget Long’s contribution to this 
volume, which estimates a model that simultaneously determines whether an individual 
attends college and, if so, which college he or she attends, integrates many of the themes 
we have discussed in this section, including the importance of college proximity in 
enrollment decisions. 
Where students attend college depends, of course, on the criteria that colleges and 
universities use in admitting students. Research suggests that under represented 
minorities were given preference in admissions only at the nation’s most selective private 
and public institutions in the 1980s and that at many selective institutions a narrowing of 
the extent of preference had taken place over time (Kane 1998, Bowen and Bok 1998). 
However, Long (this issue) suggests that by the mid 1990s such preferences were more 
widespread. Evidence from cohorts of students attending a set of selective private and 
public universities over a thirty year period suggests that scores on the much maligned 
Scholastic Assessment Test (SAT) do help to predict academic success and that these 
tests tend to over predict, rather than under predict African American students 
performance (Bowen and Bok 1998). Jesse Rothstein’s paper in this volume shows, 
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however, that the importance of SAT scores in predicting performance declines when 
characteristics of applicants’ high schools are also included in the analysis. Given the 
importance of the SAT and the fact that retaking it often leads to higher test scores, 
Vigdor and Clotfelter (forthcoming) analyze what determines whether students take the 
SAT more than once and how colleges and universities use such information. 
 A series of court decisions and legislative actions in the 1990s, which prohibited 
affirmative action in admissions has led a number of states, including Florida, Texas and 
California, to adopt “percentage admit rules” for their public higher education 
institutions. In these states, students who graduate in the top x percent of their high 
school classes are guaranteed admission to flagship campuses. Kain and O’Brien (2001) 
analyze how the “top 10 percent” rule in Texas has affected the enrollment decisions of 
Texas high school graduates. Students cannot be admitted to an institution, however, 
unless they apply to that institution. In his paper in this volume, Mark Long addresses 
how these changes in admission rules have affected minority and other students’ 
decisions as to which institutions to apply to within a state and their probabilities of also 
applying to out-of-state institutions. 
Students must decide not only where to go to college but what specific subjects to 
study and what occupations to enter. Not surprisingly, students’ choices of majors are 
heavily determined by the economic opportunities in the occupations for which a major 
prepares them, by the nonpecuniary conditions of employment in these occupations, by 
their academic aptitude and by the gender composition of people already in the 
occupation (Dynan and Rouse 1997, Berger 1998, Eide 1998, Eide and Waehrer 1998, 
Montmarquette, Cannings and Mahserekjian forthcoming, Turner and Bowen 1999).  
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Peter Arciadiacono paper in this volume very carefully analyzes choices of college major 
in the context of a dynamic model of behavior that allows the returns to ability to differ 
across majors. Erica Field (2000) explores how the timing of career contingent financial 
aid influences whether law students will enter public interest careers. 
One pressing issue facing American education in the decades ahead is how to 
generate a flow of highly qualified elementary and secondary school teachers. As other 
professional occupations, such as law, medicine, and business, that pay much more than 
teaching opened up to women during the last 30 years of the 20th century, the ability (as 
measured by test scores) of young people entering the teaching profession declined 
(Manski 1987, Hanushek and Page 1994). Evidence indicates that teachers’ academic 
ability is an important predictor of how much students learn (Ferguson 1991, Ferguson 
and Ladd 1996, Ehrenberg and Brewer 1995) While an obvious way to induce bright 
students to enter teaching careers would be to substantially increase the salaries of 
teachers, this would involve considerable increases in the revenue needed to finance 
elementary and secondary education. In his paper in the volume, Randall Reback 
analyzes whether the expansion at selective colleges and universities of teacher 
preparation programs that permit students to receive teaching credentials within 4 years 
would lead to an increased flow of academically talented college students to teach in 
public schools. 
 
IV. The Academic Labor Market 
 
Studies of the labor market for college and university faculty begin with analyses of 
the flow of students into PhD study, the determinants of times to degree, the changing 
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role and length of postdoctoral appointments in some fields, and the decision by new 
PhDs to accept academic rather than nonacademic positions. Much of the research in 
these areas conducted prior to 1990 is summarized in Ehrenberg (1991, 1992). 
The determinants of times to degree and completion rates were postulated long ago to 
be functions of the job market for new PhDs and the patterns of financial aid the doctoral 
students received (Breneman 1976). Formal tests of these hypotheses, using longitudinal 
data on individuals enrolled in PhD programs in six fields at one university and 
competing risk duration models, were presented by Ehrenberg and Mavos (1995). 
Siegfried and Strock (2001) have presented evidence on the importance of financial aid 
patterns for times to degree for economics PhD students at a wide variety of institutions. 
During the last 30 years the share of new PhDs granted by U.S universities to 
foreigners has increased substantially (Stephan et, al. 2002a). During the same period of 
time, the share of new PhDs granted to under represented minorities has remained low. 
Some have expressed concern that the growth in the foreign PhD student population has 
eliminated opportunities for underrepresented minorities to pursue PhD study. While 
there may be some truth to this belief, a study that addressed the admissions decisions of 
a set of major research universities found that, holding constant measures of student 
quality (grades and test scores), academic departments appeared to discriminate against 
foreign students and in favor of under represented minority students in the PhD program 
admissions process (Attiyeh and Attiyeh 1997). Others have expressed concern that 
foreign graduate students who serve as teaching assistants may adversely affect how 
much undergraduate students learn, however the evidence to support this contention is 
mixed (Borjas 2000, Fleisher, Hashimoto and Weinberg 2002) 
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Numerous studies have analyzed the salaries of faculty members at a single institution 
or national samples of faculty to learn if salaries are related to measures of productivity 
(Hamermesh, Johnson and Weisbrod 1982, Hamermesh 1988) and if colleges and 
universities have monopsony power over their senior faculty (Ransom 1993, Hallack 
1995, Monks and Robinson 2001). Others have analyzed whether there are gender 
differentials in earnings and promotion probabilities (Booth, Frank and Blackby 2001, 
Levin and Stephan 1998, Monks and Robinson 2000, Ginther and Hayes 1999, Hoffman 
1976) and why females are underrepresented, relative to their share in the PhD 
population, at major research universities (Barbezat 1992). Still others have analyzed 
whether, holding other factors constant, faculty employed under collective bargaining 
agreements are paid more and have lower quit rates than faculty who are not covered by 
collective bargaining agreements (Barbezat 1989, Rees 1993, 1994, Ashraf 1997, Monks 
2000a). Recently attention has also been directed to the effect of unions on the 
compensation of staff, other than faculty, at higher education institutions (Klaff and 
Ehrenberg 2002) 
Studies also suggest that voluntary turnover of faculty is higher at institutions that pay 
lower average salaries (Ehrenberg, Kasper and Rees 1991) and that assistant professors 
demand and receive a compensating starting salary differential for positions that offer 
low probabilities of tenure (Ehrenberg, Pieper and Willis 1998).  Other economists 
concerned with issues relating to the end of mandatory retirement for faculty that took 
place in 1994, have addressed how faculty productivity varies over the life cycle (Levin 
and Stephan 1991, Goodwin and Sauer 1995, Oster and Hamermesh 1998), how the end 
of mandatory retirement influenced retirement rates at universities (Ashenfelter and Card 
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2002, Ehrenberg, Matier and Fontanella 2001, Clark, Ghent and Krebs 2001) and whether 
early retirement incentive programs for faculty covered by a defined benefit pension plan 
led to increased faculty retirements (Pencavel 2002). Finally, the impact of the growing 
cost of doing science on faculty employment and salary levels has been studied 
(Ehrenberg forthcoming). 
 
V. Models of University Behavior 
 
The modeling of the university as an organization producing multiple outputs and 
maximizing an objective function subject to constraints was first introduced in the work 
of Becker (1979), Garvin (1980) and James (1990). A unique feature of models of the 
university is that its customers (students) are also inputs into its production function 
(Rothshild and White 1995), which leads the prestige maximizing university to be 
concerned about the quality of its student body and to be engaged in an “arms race” of 
spending to make itself look more attractive to potential students and thus in a quest for 
ever increasing resources (Winston 1999).  
Published measures of institutional rankings, the best known of which is the annual 
ranking of institutions for undergraduates conducted by U.S. News & World Report, 
exacerbate the competition between institutions for top students as research indicates that 
applicant behavior is very much conditioned by the rankings (Monks and Ehrenberg 
1999). The subjective ratings of PhD programs conducted by the National Research 
Council each decade or so have been analyzed in a hedonic framework to give 
institutions insight into how to improve their own departments’ rankings (Ehrenberg and 
Hurst 1998, Becker, Toutkoushian and Dunbar 1998). 
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Admission and financial aid decisions have been analyzed in the context of utility 
maximizing models of selective academic institutions and the framework yields 
information on which behavioral parameters and characteristics of the utility function 
should influence the extent to which an institution practices “preferential packaging” for 
different groups of applicants (Ehrenberg and Sherman 1984). These authors also 
illustrate how to estimate the key parameters needed to make such decisions. Focusing on 
admissions to graduate programs, Lawrence Marsh and Arnold Zellner show in their 
paper in this issue how Baysian analyses may be employed to aid in such decisions. 
Linsenmeirer, Rosen and Rouse (2002) have estimated how changes in one 
institution’s financial aid policies helped it to meet a goal of enhancing enrollments of 
low-income and underrepresented minority students. Institutions are ranked as more 
selective in the USNWR ranking scheme when they admit smaller fractions of their 
applicants and when higher fractions of the applicants they accept decide to enroll at their 
institution. One way to show improvement on both dimensions of selectivity is to admit 
more students via the early admissions route (Ehrenberg 2000, chapter 5) and as more 
selective colleges and universities have adopted this strategy the whole applications and 
admissions process has become more of a strategic game (Avery, Fairbanks and 
Zeckhauser 1998) 
Models of the utility maximizing university have also been used to analyze how a 
change in federal support for graduate students impacts upon the size of an institution’s 
graduate program, both in the aggregate and across fields (Ehrenberg, Rees and Brewer 
1993), how institutions have altered their tuition and institutional financial aid policies in 
response to changes in the federal Pell grant program (McPherson, Schapiro and Winston 
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1994, chapter 8) and whether the adoption of the HOPE scholarship program in Georgia 
affected tuition decisions of colleges and universities in the state (Long 2002b).  Given 
concern about the nature of the academic production function, attempts have been made 
to test if “peer effects”, the composition of the student body at an institution and the 
composition of an individual’s more immediate peers (roommates, friends etc.) influence 
the amount that students learn as undergraduates and as medical students and how peer 
effects influence institutions’ pricing decisions (Arcidiacono and Nicholson 2002, 
Goethals et. al. 1999, Zimmerman 1999, Zimmerman forthcoming, Sarcerdote 2001, 
Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner 2001, Kremer and Levy 2002, Winston and Zimmerman 
2002, Epple, Romano and Sieg forthcoming). 
A major source of funding for colleges and universities is annual giving from alumni, 
other individuals, corporations and foundations. Research has addressed how the 
financial aid given to students while they were enrolled influences their future giving 
(Clotfelter forthcoming, Dugan, Mullin and Siegfried 2000), how athletic teams records 
influence giving, both to athletics and the rest of the university (Baede and Sundberg 
1996, Cunningham and Cochi-Ficano, 2002, Shulman and Bowen 2000, Turner, Meserve 
and Bowen 2001), whether too much success in growing endowments leads to lower 
levels of giving (Oster 2001) and how decisions are made to allocate giving across 
current operations, capital facilities and endowment building uses (Ehrenberg and Smith, 
forthcoming). Other researchers have asked whether success of big time athletic teams 
feeds back into improved academic credentials of future freshman classes  (Mixon 1995) 
and what the factors are that the determine the athletics success of different institutions 
within a single collegiate athletic conference (Kotlyraenko and Ehrenberg (2000). 
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 Efforts have also been made to estimate production functions for teaching and 
research at colleges and universities, often with a view towards making statements about 
optimal scale and scope (de Groot, McMahon and Volkwein 1991, Dolan and Schmidt 
1994, Dundar and Lewis 1995, Koshal and Koshal 1999). The substitutability of part-
time for full-time faculty in the production of teaching in response to change in relative 
wages has also been examined (Tuckman and Katz 1981). Given that colleges and 
universities are not necessarily cost minimizers and thus may not necessarily be on their 
production frontiers, some researchers have analyzed higher education production 
functions using frontier estimation methods (Johnes and Johnes 1995, McMillan and 
Chan 2001, Izadi, H. et. al. 2002).  
     Many of the educational production function studies focus on numbers of degrees 
granted by or number of credit hours taken at an institution. A different strand of 
literature, exemplified by Becker and Powers (2001) addresses the important question of 
how students’ class sizes influence their persistence in classes and the amount that they 
learn. 
Another output of research universities is the commercialization of research through 
the production of patents and through licensing arrangements. Research has addressed the 
patent production function, the relationship between patent policies, research and 
teaching at a university and the productivity of licensing arrangements (Thursby and 
Thursby 2000, Thursby and Kemp 2002, Thursby, Jensen and Thursby, 2001, Stephan et. 
al. 2002b, Jensen and Thursby 2003). Finally researchers have studied the production 
function for research grants and the role that lobbying efforts and earmarks play (De 
Figueiredo and Silverman 2002, Payne and Siow 1998) 
 17
V. Higher Education as an Industry and Higher Education Governance 
Goldin and Katz (1999) provide an explanation of the historical evolution of 
American higher education during the 1890 to 1940 period. They provide explanations 
for the large average size higher education institutions, the coexistence of liberal arts 
colleges and large research universities, the substantial share of enrollments in the public 
sector, the location of professional schools within larger universities and the varying 
levels of state support for higher education. Focusing on the period since 1940, Hoxby 
(1997) analyzes the changing market structure of higher education and shows that the 
results of increased competition were higher average college quality and tuitions, greater 
between-college variations in tuition and student quality and less within college variation 
in student quality. Hoxby (2000) also investigates whether the consent degree signed by 
the Ivy League institutions in the early 1990s that prevented them from discussing the 
financial aid offers that they were planning to make to specific individuals who had been 
admitted to more than one of their institutions led to higher levels of financial aid and/or 
to more aid being awarded on a “merit” rather than a financial need basis.  
 A number of authors have focused on public higher education and provided 
models to explain differences across institutions and over time in state support to public 
higher education, differences in in-state tuition levels, differences in out-of-state tuition 
levels and differences in the proportion of undergraduate students at an institution 
enrolling from out-of-state (Quigley and Rubinfeld 1993, Greene 1994, Mixon and Hsing 
1994, Groen and White 2001, Rizzo and Ehrenberg 2002). One theme that emerges from 
the work of Groen and White (2001) is the conflict between the interests of faculty and 
administrators at public universities and the interests of the state that is funding the 
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institution. Lowry (2001a, 2001b) pursues this theme and shows that the governance 
structure of public higher education in a state, as represented by variables such as the 
methods by which trustees to public institutions are selected (elected or appointed), the 
number of separate governing boards for public higher education institutions in a state 
and the presence of coordinating boards influences the levels of tuition charged to in-state 
residents and expenditures per student. 
 Once one views higher education as a system, the interdependencies between 
institutions become more apparent. One relatively neglected research area has been the 
connection between 2-year and 4-year colleges. Two-year colleges serve as the point of 
entry for many students who otherwise would receive no higher education 
(democratization), but students who start in 2-year colleges may be less likely to ultimate 
complete 4-year degrees than students who start in 4-year colleges (diversion). Rouse 
(1995. 1998) asks whether on balance the presence of 2-year colleges enhances the 
overall education level of Americans. Hilmer (1997) addresses whether starting at a 2-
year college allows students to subsequently attend a higher quality 4-year institution 
than they would have been able to if they entered a 4-year institution directly after 
graduation from high school.  Ehrenberg and Smith (2002) study transitions from 2-year 
to 4-year colleges within one large state system and develop and empirical methodology 
to estimate which 4-year colleges perform the best at educating the 2-year college 
students that transfer to them and which 2-year colleges’ students that transfer are most 
likely to perform the best at the 4-year institutions. 
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VI. Concluding Remarks 
Any review of the literature in an area, no matter how comprehensive it may seem, 
reflects its author’s interests and background. Readers familiar with my research will not 
be surprised that most of the literature that I have surveyed has been conducted by 
economists with backgrounds in labor and public economics and/or interests in the 
application of maximization models to the behavior of nonprofit institutions.  
Literature reviews also reflect the set of research problems that researchers have 
studied and do not necessarily cover issues that few people have ventured to explore. So 
at the risk of going out on a limb, I will mention a few of the latter that I believe to be 
important areas for research. These relate to asset allocation at a point in time, inter 
temporal allocation of assets, and investments in development or fund-raising activities. 
During the 1970s foundation reports, such as Ennis and Williamson (1976), and 
academic researchers, such as James Tobin (1974), encouraged universities to pursue a 
policy of basing their spending from their endowments on some fraction of the total long-
run return that they expected their endowments to earn. The stock market boom of the 
late 1990s and then its collapse at the start of the 21st century suggests some problems 
with such spending rules. Moreover, little thought has been given by researchers as to 
what the optimal allocation of an academic institution’s portfolio across asset classes 
should be and how this optimal allocation should vary with the risk the institution faces 
from its other revenue streams (tuition, state appropriations, annual giving, research 
funding, executive education income, etc.). Kaufman and Woglom (2002) have begun to 
address the latter question. 
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Similarly, little attention has been directed toward and institutions’ s optimal 
spending rule should vary with the expected growth rates of each of these other revenue 
sources. For example, one’s intuition is that public higher education institutions that are 
faced with prospects of continued cut backs in their real level of state support per student 
should spend a smaller share of their endowment value each year than their counterparts 
that expect real state support to increase. 
 Furthermore, while it is well known that many academic institutions have great 
stores of financial assets, it is much less well known these institutions also have great 
stocks of physical capital (plant and equipment) assets. Financial and physical assets both 
support the academic programs of academic institutions, however, how institutions 
allocate their asset portfolio between these two classes of assets varies widely across 
institutions. For example, in the mid 1990s, Yale’s endowment was approximately twice 
the replacement value of its physical capital assets while the comparable ratio for 
Northwestern was about .8 (Ehrenberg 2000, table 11.1). To date there has been only one 
study that sought to explain why the ratio of financial to physical plant assets varies 
across institutions (Siegfried and Getz 2003). 
 Finally, private giving has increasingly become an important source of revenue 
for America’s private and public higher education institutions, providing them with over 
$24 billion in revenue in the fiscal year ending June 30, 2001 (Pulley 2002). The research 
on annual giving that I described above does not address the issue of how institutions 
decide how much to invest in their development (or advancement) efforts to produce 
annual giving. Studies have concluded that the average cost of each dollar raised by 
academic institutions is less than 20 cents (Ehrenberg 2000, chapter 3). If the marginal 
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costs of these efforts were approximately equal to the average costs, one might question 
why the academic institutions don’t significantly expand their development activities. I 
have offered some explanations myself (Ehrenberg 2000, chapter 3), but econometric 
research on why the size of development operations varies across academic institutions 
and whether these sizes are anywhere near “optimal” has yet to be undertaken. 
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